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Delaying Repatriation: Japanese Technicians in Early Post-war China
Over the last decade or so, interest in the repatriation of the Japanese1 civilian citizens who
resided in the former Manchukuo at the time of the Japanese surrender has attracted
increasing scholarly attention. This research has overwhelmingly focussed on the Japanese
citizens who wished to return to Japan and the difficulties – personal and political - they
faced in order to do so.2 As research as focussed primarily on the Japanese who wanted to
return to Japan as soon as possible, an assumption that all Japanese wanted to return to Japan
has developed. Yet, as this paper shows, not all Japanese wanted to immediately return to
Japan and some made the conscious decision to remain in China, at least in the short to
medium term.

This paper examines the issue of the repatriation of the Japanese from Manchukuo in terms
of the concepts of involuntary and voluntary repatriation. Specifically, the analysis covers the
political and functional realities faced by some of the technicians from the South Manchurian
Railroad Company’s (hereafter Mantetsu) Central Research Laboratories (hereafter CRL),
when making their decisions as to whether to stay or to leave. Importantly, the reasons
behind the technicians’ decision to stay differed depending on the individual and across time.
The paper develops these ideas using biographical information and jibunshi (self-histories)
written on or by the technicians. Whilst I accept Figal’s (1996, p. 916) argument that the use
of jibunshi can be problematic because they often lack critical reflection and are written a
long time after the events covered, I believe that they are useful indicators of the situations
that the authors found themselves in and the decisions they faced. I therefore use them for
these purposes.

Involuntary versus Voluntary Repatriation
In its broadest terms, repatriation means the return of citizens to their homeland. This return
may involve either an international or an intra-country movement and either can follow
natural disasters or the end of conflict. The time lag between the departure from the
homeland and a repatriate’s return can vary from a matter of days to months or even years.
Importantly, repatriation can be either voluntarily (freely) or involuntarily (forcibly) made.
Whilst the conditions in either or both the departure point and the destination can play a role
in whether a person wishes to be repatriated or not, the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary repatriation is primarily lies in whether the repatriate chooses to leave the
departure point or not. Put simply, where a repatriate chooses to leave the point of departure,
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then their repatriation is voluntary but where they are forced to leave against their wishes,
then their repatriation is involuntary. However, repatriation in its entirety is more complex
than a simple choice between leaving or not: it also involves issues such as the timing of the
repatriation and the destination. As an example, a repatriate may wish to leave their departure
point but may not be allowed to leave when they want to. In such cases, repatriation is not
completely voluntary and therefore is partly an involuntary repatriation. Sakama Fumiko’s
repatriation from the Soviet Union in 1955 for instance, was voluntary in that she wanted to
leave but it was also involuntary in that her destination was not Dalian, the city she
considered ‘home’, but Japan where she had never previously been (Sakama 1955). As such,
her repatriation was not completely voluntary. In effect, involuntary repatriation is broader
than the issue of being forced to leave but also includes situations where a repatriate does not
consent to one element of their repatriation whether it be when, where to or whether they
actually want to make the journey or not.

The flipside of non-repatriation is a continued stay in the potential point of departure. Where
people do not wish to leave, then their stay is voluntary but when they want to leave but are
unable to do so, their stay is involuntary. The Japanese in the former Manchukuo are often
assumed to have wanted to be repatriated to Japan and therefore their repatriation is usually
thought of as being voluntary and until their repatriation, their stay is assumed to have been
involuntary. However, as is shown below, for some people, the situation was more complex
than these assumptions allow.

Background to the Repatriation of Japanese from the former Manchukuo
On 26 July 1945, Great Britain, the United States and the Kuomintang governments outlined
their terms under which they would end their war with Japan in the Potsdam Declaration.
The Soviet Union, which was to invade Manchukuo on 9 August, was a signatory to a
neutrality agreement with Japan at the time and consequently was not party to the declaration.
Clause 9 of the declaration reads:
The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to
return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
This text formed the foundation of the organisation of the repatriation of the Japanese
overseas. The wording of the declaration indicates an assumption by its signatories that the
Japanese would want to return to Japan. However, as Kobayashi (2000: 167-168) notes,
Clause 9 does not include any provision for the repatriation of Japanese civilians. Yet, around
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half of the estimated six million Japanese overseas in August 1945, were civilians. Around
1.2 million were in Manchukuo where another half a million Japanese military personnel
were stationed. The wording of Clause 9 also indicates an expectation that repatriation
programs would be available. In the case of military personnel across the Pacific, such
programs were quickly put in place and repatriation was largely complete by the end of
1946.3 In the case of the former Manchukuo however, it was May 1946 – almost nine months
after the Japanese surrender - before the first Japanese were repatriated from Hulutao and it
was December 1946 before any departed Dalian.
Shortly after Japan’s unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945, the United States realised
the limitations of Clause 9 and subsequently reconsidered its policies towards repatriation.
Its new policy read:
First priority will be granted to the movement of Japanese military and naval personnel,
and second priority to the movement of Japanese civilians (in MacArthur General Staff
1948: 151).
According to Yang (1998: 192) this change in the American position was due to a view
outlined in the Far Eastern sub-committee of the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee
that any Japanese civilians who remained in China did so with the aim of assisting in a
resurgence of Japanese power. Irrespective of what drove the change, the new policy
constitutes the first official recognition of the existence of the Japanese civilians and the need
to provide for their repatriation. Despite the change in policy however, the main focus of the
repatriation programs remained on the demobilisation and repatriation of military personnel
and the plans for the repatriation of the Japanese civilians focussed more on the practicalities
of their transportation to Japan in the assumption that the Japanese wished to be repatriated.

Manchukuo
The state of Manchukuo was established by the Japanese Government in March 1932. Over
the ensuing 13 years, the Japanese population in the region grew as unskilled workers, skilled
technicians and agrarian settlers migrated from Japan. These new migrants were in addition
to the Japanese who had emigrated to the region after Japan assumed control over the
Liaodong Peninsula following the Russo-Japan war of 1905.4 Among the skilled emigrants
were expatriate workers sent to Manchukuo by their employers. These included technicians
employed by the Minami manshū testudō kaisha (South Manchuria Railroad Company), or
Mantetsu. By the time Manchukuo disappeared in August 1945, some families, such as the
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Kuramoto family, had been in Manchukuo for three generations (Kuramoto 1999: x) but
many had been there only a matter of years and in some cases, only a few months. Okumura
Kiyoaki and his family, for instance, left Osaka on 27 May 1945 and had only arrived in
Manchukuo in early June (Ōkubo 2004: 123).

Within a week of the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo on 9 August 1945, Japan had accepted
an unconditional surrender. By the time of the ceasefire in Manchukuo on 19 August, the
Soviet Army, which had met only sporadic resistance from the Kwantung Army, had almost
reached the old border with China. The Soviet Union would remain in control of most of the
former Manchukuo until its withdrawal in May 1946.5

The power vacuum that emerged after the Soviet withdrawal saw control of some areas of the
former Manchukuo swing back and forth between the Chinese Communists and the
Kuomintang as the Chinese civil war raged. The effect of both the Soviet invasion and the
Chinese civil war on the Japanese and Chinese civilian populations was immense. It is
estimated that around 162,000 Japanese citizens, including many women and children, died
in the 19 months after the Japanese surrender (Nimmo 1988: 28). Another 594,000 Japanese
men and women were transported to the Soviet Union where they were forced to work
(Kirichenko 2003: 8). The instability also had major repercussions for the employment of the
Japanese. Some continued to work in the same jobs they had held before the Japanese
surrender but many others eked out a living the best way they could until they could leave.
The extended Kuramoto family for instance, sold tempura as well as the family’s jewellery
and kimonos from booths located in a former department store (Kuramoto 1999: 87-88).

Repatriation of Japanese citizens from Manchukuo
Whilst under Soviet rule, no Japanese citizens were repatriated directly from the former
Manchukuo to Japan. In May 1946, repatriation ships left Huludao – outside the former
Manchukuo - carrying Japanese citizens who had managed to leave areas under Soviet
control. Besides some Japanese who had fled across the Korean peninsula and were
repatriated from there, the people aboard the ships leaving Hulatao were the first Japanese
civilians from the former Manchukuo to return to Japan. Repatriation from Dalian began in
December 1946, more than six months after the Soviet withdrawal. Repatriation continued at
irregular intervals until September 1949 when the transportation of all Japanese from the
newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) was suspended. A second repatriation
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program, operated under the auspices of the Japanese and Chinese Red Cross, commenced in
1953 and continued on an irregular basis until 1958 when all repatriations programs were
terminated. Japanese citizens who were unable to exit China under these programs were
effectively forced to remain in the PRC until diplomatic relations between the two countries
were established in September 1972.6

The effect of the stop-start nature of the repatriation programs was multilayered. On one
hand, whenever repatriation was not permitted, the Japanese civilians were forced to remain
in China. That is, they had little choice as to whether to leave or not and therefore, were
involuntarily forced to stay. On the other hand, when a repatriation program was in place,
some Japanese were encouraged to leave whilst others were discouraged from doing so. That
is, some were able to voluntarily leave and others were involuntarily made to stay. The
authorities – both in Japan and in China - generally assumed that the Japanese would want to
leave and worked towards enabling this to occur. However, some Japanese, particularly those
with a job and those who were born and raised there, wished to stay. In the case of those who
were working, the decision to stay was often a pragmatic decision driven by a belief that they
may not be able to obtain employment in Japan due to the depressed conditions there.

The Chinese Communists and Kuomintang took similar positions vis-à-vis the repatriation of
the Japanese in areas under their control. The Kuomintang largely encouraged Japanese
citizens to return home although they preferred technicians to stay (Fukushima 1955: 179).
According to Nimmo (1998: 28), quoting figures from a May 1947 cable from the American
Ambassador in China, around 11,300 Japanese technicians were employed by the
Kuomintang. Later, as the Kuomintang’s control deteriorated, it began encouraging the
Japanese technicians to leave so that they would not be able to assist the Communists
(Nagami 2006: 101). Similarly, the Communists wanted the Japanese technicians to stay
since they wanted to utilise their skills in the redevelopment of infrastructure and the training
of local workers (Nagami 2006: 101). According to Chan (2006: 59), the Communists vetted
the Japanese repatriates, allowing those without special technical skills to leave but prevented
those with the skills they needed from leaving. For the Japanese technicians themselves, such
policies saw some voluntarily return to Japan but for others it became an involuntary stay in
China. In effect, views toward repatriation differed among the various political powers as
well as within the Japanese population.
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Mantetsu
Mantetsu or ‘The South Manchuria Railroad Company’ was established in 1906 with its
headquarters in Dalian.7 By the 1930s it had monopolistic control over the main industries
across Manchukuo but a restructure late that decade saw it lose many of its monopolies (Nish
1998: 183). Nevertheless, Mantetsu still remained a highly influential company in the region
not least of all due to its control over the railway system. For many years, Mantetsu was
considered as a desirable employer and consequently attracted some of Japan’s best
graduates.

Throughout its history, Mantetsu consciously remained a Japanese company and decision
making remained firmly in Japanese hands. In line with this philosophy, non-Japanese
workers were mostly employed in lower paid and unskilled positions (Nagami 2003: 9) and
Japanese workers were employed in managerial and skilled positions. This strategy was to
have an unexpected influence on the employment of the Japanese technicians after the end of
the war.
In March 1945, Mantetsu had 341, 836 employees, of which 93,815 were Japanese (Katō
2006: 193). After the war, a number of former Mantetsu employees became leaders in
Japanese industry, politics and academia. For instance, Hagiwara Teiji, a former researcher in
CRL, joined the newly established JETRO shortly after his repatriation from China in 1954
and was a member of the first Japanese Trade mission to Beijing and Shanghai in 1956.

On 25 August 1945, an agreement was signed between the Soviets and the Kuomintang for
the joint administration of Mantetsu (Kobayashi 2006: 314). Two days later, on 27 August,
the Sino–Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Alliance which had been signed on 14 August was
made public. According to this Treaty, the Chinese Eastern Railways and Mantetsu were to
be merged to form the Chinese Changchun Railway which would be jointly administered by
China and the Soviet Union with each receiving equal profits. The plan was for the
administrative structure to continue for 20 years after which the railway would come under
sole Chinese control.8 On 28 September, Mantetsu was formally closed down and on 30
September, the Allies ordered that the company be broken up. According to Fukushima
(1955: 178), an Allied Commanding Officer stated on 11 April 1946 that all of Mantetsu’s
Japanese workers had been dismissed by the beginning of December 1945. Whilst the
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Commanding Officer may have been technically correct since Mantetsu no longer existed,
the reality was that a large number of Mantetsu’s technicians, including those from CRL,
continued to be employed albeit now by the governments in control of the region.
Fukushima (1955: 178) adds that those on the ground were not aware of their supposed
dismissal.
The Chūō shiken-jo (CRL) was established in October 1907 as a Kwantung Provincial
Government instrumentality (Nagami 2006: 100) and came under the Mantetsu umbrella in
1910. Its primary role was to undertake scientific research related to industrial and resource
development. For instance, it undertook research into agricultural fertilisers and the
manufacture of aluminium. Its research functions therefore differed to its much more wellknown cousin, the Survey Department (Chōsa-bu), which undertook primarily cultural,
historical and sociological studies. Like the Survey Department however, the activities of the
CRL were closely aligned with Japan’s plans for the development of Manchukuo as part of
the Japanese Empire.

In 1944, the CRL was removed from the Mantetsu umbrella and was renamed the
‘Manchukuo CRL’. At one point, CRL had eight research offices and a number of
manufacturing plants across the country but with conditions deteriorating, a number of these
had been closed by August 1945. At the end of the war, it is estimated that CRL had around
800 employees plus another 200 or so trainees (Mantetsu-kai 1996: 604). Around 600 of the
employees were technicians or more specifically, scientists and engineers. Most had been
educated in Japan and migrated to Manchukuo for employment opportunities, often to
specifically work for Mantetsu. At the time of the Soviet invasion, CRL was headed by
Marusawa Tsuneya, who had been appointed the Managing Director in July 1943.

Shortly after the Soviet invasion, the Chief of the Survey Department, Utsumi Jiichi, gave
orders for all company records – including the research records – to be burnt so that they
would not fall into enemy hands (Sugita 2004: 279-280). Although this directive was also
meant for CRL, Marusawa called all CRL employees together on 21 August and ordered that
no facilities were to be destroyed and no documents be burnt. The reason behind Marusawa’s
decision was his wish that the company’s research records be handed over to a suitable
Chinese person who could continue the research for the benefit of China. Understandably,
some people disagreed with Marusawa’s decision not to destroy the company’s records but
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he successfully organised for copies of CRL’s research, complete with abstracts in English,
to be placed in the Dalian Library where they reportedly still remain (Sugita 2004: 273) .

In 1946, CRL was merged with the Survey Department and a number of other organisations
to form the ‘Science Research Institute of the Chinese Changchun Railway’ (Hirota 1990:
74). With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China assumed control of the Institute.

Employment after the Soviet invasion
With the disappearance of Manchukuo, large numbers of Japanese lost their jobs but a small
percentage, as noted earlier were hired by the Soviets, the Chinese Communists or the
Kuomintang to work in various industries of strategic importance. Since the railway played a
major role in transportation and communication between cities, many Mantetsu workers,
particularly the technicians who designed and maintained the railway, were among those
hired. Some technicians continued doing the same duties which they had performed prior to
the invasion whilst others were hired to train local workers to take over the operations of the
railway. To encourage Japanese skilled workers, such as economists and technicians, to stay
in China and help with the country’s (re)construction, the Chūgoku keizai kensetsu gakkai
(Chinese Economic Construction Association) was formed in 1946 (Marusawa 1955: 55). In
the same year, the Kuomintang introduced the Nisseki gijutsukō chōyō benhō (Law on the
Drafting of Japanese Skilled Workers) which governed the employment of technicians
(Nagami 2006: 99). As an inducement to stay and work in China, the Japanese skilled
employees were paid well. In the case of CRL, Marusawa Tsuneya received ¥1,200 per
month whilst Japanese workers under him received ¥1,000-¥1,100 per month. In contrast,
local workers earned about ¥300-¥400 per month (Hirota 1990: 75).9
It is in the context of the various governments’ need for technical assistance that Mantetsu’s
reliance on Japanese technicians is important. It is highly likely that had more local workers
been trained before the Soviet invasion, Mantetsu’s technicians would not have been in such
demand by the Soviets, Chinese Communist and Kuomintang authorities after August 1945.

Repatriating the CRL employees
As noted earlier, repatriation from Dalian began in December 1946. The commencement of
repatriation was welcomed by most of the Japanese as they had been stranded in the former
Manchukuo among people who were often hostile towards them. When the passenger list for
8

the first ship to leave for Japan was announced in late 1946, the name of the Managing
Director of CRL, Marusawa Tsuneya, was on it. However, according to Marusawa himself
(1955: 56), Satō Masanori, a former CRL Director, wanted to return quickly to Japan for
family reasons and asked for Marusawa’s assistance in making it happen. Believing that the
Chinese would not allow both of them to leave, Marusawa volunteered to stay in Satō’s place.
The Chinese gave their permission and consequently Satō’s name was replaced by
Marusawa’s on the passenger list. In his memoirs, Marusawa (1955: 56) explains that he was
pleased to see Satō return to Japan as he hoped Satō would be able to use his contacts to help
find employment for former CRL workers who he thought may have been tainted by their
colonial experience. Satō arrived back in Japan in 1947. It was to be 1955 before Marusawa
joined him.

Of the 600 Japanese technicians employed by CRL in August 1945, 520 were repatriated
from Dalian in January 1947. The remaining 80 employees included a small number of
women (Sugita 1990: 227). In July 1947, a further 50 CRL employees were repatriated.
According to Mantetsu-kai (1996: 607), of the 30 that remained, 15 did so at the request of
the Soviets and 15 at the request of the Chinese. That is, they were asked to stay. There is no
indication as to whether those who remained were personally asked to stay or whether a
figure of 30 was announced and the technicians were left to negotiate among themselves as
to who would stay and who could leave. A further 20 left in September 1949 on one of the
last ships to leave Dalian before the suspension of the repatriation program. The remaining
10 were unable to leave China until a repatriation program, administered jointly by the
Chinese and Japanese Red Cross was organised in 1953.
Not all the technicians who ‘voluntarily’ stayed behind when the first repatriation ships left
Dalian, actually wanted to stay. Some, recognising that their skills meant that they would not
be allowed to leave, adopted false names in an attempt to be prevented from leaving
(Nakamura and Kaneko 2003: 33). Others volunteered to stay under pressure from other
Japanese. Tanaka for instance, ‘volunteered’ to stay because his Supervisor asked him to in
order that the Supervisor himself would be allowed to leave (Nakamura and Kaneko 2003:
33-34). The Supervisor justified his request on the basis that Tanaka was single whilst he
himself had a large family to look after. Others stayed because of a sense of failure and a
feeling that as the ‘losers’ of the war, they could not refuse to stay if asked to by the Chinese
or Kuomintang governments (Nakamura and Kaneko 2003: 33). In some cases, the
9

technicians chose to stay because of concerns that they would not be able find work in Japan.
According to Yang (1998: 188) the Japanese government also wished that the technicians
would stay as it would ‘help alleviate unemployment pressures’ at home and would help
foster Japan’s long term interests in China. Whilst it is difficult to say how much influence
the Japanese government had on civilian Japanese affairs in China at the time, some
technicians did choose to stay in China due to concerns about their employment prospects in
Japan.

1949: Last to leave
In the lead up to the departure of the last repatriation ships in 1949, the Chinese authorities
requested that 10 Japanese CRL technicians remain in China. Marusawa immediately agreed
to stay. Hagiwara (1973) suggests that Marusawa’s decision was based on a desire to help in
the rebuilding of China. According to Tang (2005: 24), Marusawa once said, ‘I did not know
about political economic issues and became a carrier of Japan’s invasion of China.’ This
attitude hints at Marusawa’s decision to remain in China. Marusawa also encouraged others –
including Hagiwara Teiji – to do so. In discussing his decision to stay, Hagiwara wrote that
he wanted to quickly return to his research activities but stayed in China partly because
Marusawa had decided to stay and partly because he was asked to by the Chinese authorities
(Hagiwara 1973: 5). By the time the repatriation ships departed, 10 CRL technicians and
their families – a total of around 25 people – had agreed to stay. The deteriorating situation
on the Korean peninsula at the time meant that the CRL technicians who decided to stay were
aware that it may be sometime before they could return to Japan. In fact, it was to be 1953
before any were able to leave the PRC. Presumably the female workers were among the 70
who were repatriated between 1947 and 1949 as there were no females among the 10
technicians who remained after September 1949.

After the last repatriation ships had departed, the 10 remaining CRL employees were
assigned to a variety of projects in and around Dalian. With the introduction of the first ‘Five
Year Plan’ in 1953, many of the Japanese technicians in the Dalian area, including the former
CRL workers, were moved to other locations across China. The CRL men were assigned to
projects in eight different locations across the country. It was from these locations that the
technicians and their families were repatriated, in all instances willingly, at various times
between 1953 and 1955. According to Hagiwara (1973: 6), the political instability in
Indochina was the reason behind the timing of his repatriation.
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On 16 January 1955, Marusawa and four other Japanese technicians from other organisations
working in the same location were told to prepare to leave (Tang 2005: 33). They arrived
back in Maizuru on the Japan Sea coast in February 1955. Marusawa was the last CRL
technician to be repatriated.

The repatriation of the last 10 CRL employees (and their families) was typically complex.
On the one hand, their repatriation was involuntary in that their Chinese employers decided
the timing of their departure but at the same time, it was voluntary in that the technicians
were now eager to return to Japan. Yet, this complexity at the end of the technicians’ stay in
China should not detract from the fact that they had volunteered to remain in China in 1949.

Reasons to stay
There were three main reasons why the Japanese technicians chose to remain in China. The
first was survival. This was most pronounced in the initial stages of repatriation when the
economic situation in Japan was at its most severe. At such a time, the technicians
rationalised that it would be difficult to find work in Japan so it was better to stay in China
where they at least had a job (Kobayashi 2000: 168). In effect, it was a pragmatic decision.
The second reason was a sense of responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War which became
manifest in a wish to assist China. Marusawa’s comment about his unintentional role in
Japan’s incursion into China reflects this attitude. A third reason is loyalty, in particular,
loyalty to their colleagues or superiors. Hagiwara’s decision to stay is an example of this
attitude. Hagiwara had known and worked with Marusawa for many years and felt enormous
loyalty to him. Speaking about his decision to stay, Hagiwara said, ‘As a Japanese,
Marusawa felt responsibility for the war and he was determined to stay to help with the
building of a new China … I stayed to encourage Marusawa’ (in Tang 2005: 28).
Marusawa’s decision to allow Satō to leave in his place in the belief that Satō could assist the
former CRL workers find work in Japan is also an example of a sense of loyalty to his staff,
impacting on the decision to stay. Irrespective of an individual’s reasons for deciding to stay,
the fact that they did, shows that immediate repatriation was not their only goal.

At the same time, it must be recognised that the repatriation of any of CRL employees at any
time, shows elements of both voluntary and involuntary stay. For instance, it was May 1946
before anyone was repatriated from the former Manchukuo and consequently the Japanese
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employees could not have left even if they wanted to. That is, they were involuntarily forced
to stay. The length of involuntary stay depended on a number of factors not least of which
was the organisation of the repatriation process itself. For those who were able to leave on
the first ships to leave Dalian, the length of their involuntary stay was less than a year, but for
those wanting to leave but couldn’t, the length of their involuntary stay depended on when
they were able to leave.
Finally, this paper has used the example of the technicians in Mantetsu’s CRL to demonstrate
that not all Japanese civilians overseas at the time of the Japanese surrender chose to return to
Japan at their first opportunity. Rather the example of the technicians illustrates the
complexities of the repatriation of the Japanese in Manchukuo, both in terms of their own
wishes and the wider political circumstances in which they found themselves. Most Japanese
civilians may have wanted to return to Japan as soon as possible but it was not the case for all
Japanese. Importantly, their predicament was also initially affected by the lack of references
to Japanese civilians in the Potsdam Declaration. Consequently, it was some time before any
Japanese civilians were in a position whereby they had the opportunity to make a choice as to
whether to stay in China or return to Japan. As a result, all Japanese were forced to stay
involuntarily in China until repatriation could be arranged. Once repatriation began, a
number of Japanese – including some of the technicians who had worked for CRL voluntarily decided to stay in China - at least in the short to medium term. The reasons
behind the technicians’ decision to stay were varied. For some, the decision was a pragmatic
one based on a belief that their employment opportunities at that time were better in China
than in Japan. But for others, their decision to stay was based on a sense of responsibility for
Japan’s activities in China (e.g. Marusawa) or a sense of loyalty to colleagues (e.g.
Hagiwara). Irrespective of their individual reasons for choosing to stay, the fact that they did
not choose to return to Japan at the first opportunity they had, and therefore delayed
repatriation undermines the assumption that all of the Japanese civilians in Manchukuo at the
end of the war, wanted to be repatriated as soon as possible.
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